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This paper explores some implications of the use of national
currencies as international reserves. First, a closed economy over-
lapping—generations model is developed to derive time—consistent tax
and inflation policies for a government that is financing a given
stream.of expenditures. Second, the effects of allowing a government
to hold a foreign currency as a reserve asset and to have its currency
held as a reserve asset abroad are considered. The use of national
currencies as currencies of denomination for international lending
creates an incentive for the governments whose currencies are used
toalter their Inflation rates to extract resources from the rest
of the world. When reserves are constrained to be nonnegative the
use of national currenciesas international reserves raises the
inflationrate In reserveissuing countries but does not effect
the Inflationrate in reserve holders. The opposite result arises
when loans are denomInated in the borrowers' currencies.
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With the decline in the role of gold in theinternational economy
the primary method that countries have used tofinance payments imbalances
has been borrowing and lending denominated in termsof national currencies.
In the last century sterling was the primary reserve currencywhile in this
century it has been the U.S. dollar. Recentlythe currencies of a number
of additional countries have emerged as international storesof values.
These currencies have also served as the primarycurrencies of denomination
of international loans. The introduction of Special DrawingRights (SDR's)
constitutes an attempt to replace national nneys with an international
money for use as an international reserve. Its adoption thus far has
been only partial, however, and its value remains tied to that of national
currencies, In the absence Of a credible cOmmitment to a commodity
exchange standard such as the gold exchange standard, the value of assets
and liabilities denominated in national currencies has been subiec.t to the
political control of the governments and central banks issuing those
currencies. The use of these currencies to finance payments imbalances
will depend upon the expectations held by international transactors about
the strength of these institutions' commitment to maintain the real values
of their currencies,
Nevertheless, a currency's introduction into use as an international
store of value changes the context in which the issuers of currencies act.
First, the process whereby national currencies are distributed throughout
theworid economy requires an adjustment viapayments.itnbalancesthat may.
have severe economic consequences for reserve issuers and holders alike.
Second the presence of large currency balances held outside the country
ofissue and of loans abroad denominated in localcurrency has serious2
implications for the effect of central bank policy on national welfare.
As a consequence, one might anticipate that being thrust Into the role
of a reserve issuer or international lender may significantly change the
issuing country's monetary policy.
It is widely recognized that the use of a currency as an inter—
national reserve and currency of denomination of international assets and
liabilities requires trust in the issuer's willingness and ability to
maintain the real value of its currency. Triff in's (1961) discussion
of thedollar problem emphasized that the U.S. dollar's widespread use
as a reserve currency could, by itself, undermine belief in its long—run
stability. The incentives facing a reserve Issuer to undermine the
value of its currency by inflation have been discussed by Mundell (1971)
and Calvo (1978).
The use of national moneys as international reserves raises a
number of questions: (i) What characteristics of a country make it
likely to emerge as a reserve issuer? (ii) How does becoming a
reserve issuer affect the inflation rate that is optimal from a national
perspective? (iii) If, in fact, the rate of return on a currency is
likely to fall if it is adopted as an international reserve, why are other
countries' central banks willing to hold this currency as a reserve if
they perceive this effect? and (iv) What are the costs and benefits of
becoming a reserve issuer and a reserve holder?
Our purpose ifl this paper is to develop a mode]. of the inter-
action of national. monetary policy and international reserves to answer
these questions. The issue is considered from the perspective of both3
reserve issuers and reserve holders.
To understand how the use of national moneys as international
reserves affects the conduct of monetary policy, one needs to specify
the objectives of the government and the technology and preferences
of the private sector. To generate a demand for currency at the
national level, the exact consumption loan model of Samuelson (1958) is
adopted. While this framework is very simple and highly stylized, it does
generate a demand for money based directly on an underlying technology
and individual preferences. Precise welfare comparisons across regimes
are therefore possible,1
We assume that the government of each country must meet an exogen-
ous level of government spending each period. This expenditure maybe
financed via a nondistortionary tax imposed on the current younger
generation or by monetary issue. The government's objectiveis to
waximize a weighted average of the lifetime utilities of all generations
of its citizens.
Section I of the paper presents a closed—economy version of the
nxdel, The tax rate and inflation rate that obtain in each period reflect
the government's weighting of the younger and older generations currently
alive, The greater the weight placed on the older generation, the lower
the inflation rate, and conversely. Only when equal weight is placed on
the representative member of each generation alive does the steady—state
rate of return on money balances equal the growth rate, achieving the golden
rule. Otherwise, the lifetime utility of the representative citizen in the
steady state is below the maximum possible level. When, in fact, this Is4
due to a rate of return on currency below the growth rate (when the govern—
Tnent places greater weight on the utility of the younger generation), the
outcome is not Pareto efficient. The problem arises because the government
inany given period cannot credibly commit itself or its successor in the
next period to avoid inflating the currency at a faster rate, thereby
reducing the rate of return on savings to the current younger generation.
It constitutes an example of the problem of the time inconsistency of
optimal policy discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
•Section II introduces foreign reserves into the ndel. It in-
corporates both domestic holdings by the government of foreign currency
and foreign holdings of domestic currency. We assume that reserve holders
take current and future returns on foreign currencies as given, anticipating
them correctly,and that reserve issuers take current and future holdings
by foreigners of their currency as given, anticipating these correctly as
well. We show that holding a foreign currency as a reserve does not
affect the steady state inflation rate of the reserve holding country.
The demand for reserves depends not only upon the government's weighting
of the two generations currently alive but upon Its weighting of future
generations. When the government assigns future generations weights
that decline geometrically into the future, then foreign reserves are
demanded perfectly elastically at the rate of return on domestic currency.
When the government acts only in the interests of generations cur-
rently alive, the demand for reserves is also infinitely elastic, but at a
rate of return that is higher than that on domestic currency.5
The rate of inflation in the reserve issuer is, however, affected
by changes in foreign holdings of domestic reserves. The effect of an
increasein foreign holdings on impact is ambiguous, but in the new steady
state, in which more reserves are held abroad, the rate of inflation in the
issuingcountry is necessarily higher.
Section III considers global equilibrium in a world in which
there are two types of countries, one characterized by a low inflation
rate under financial autarky and another by a high inflation rate under
financiai. autarky. We distinguish two cases, one in which gross
international lending is always denominated in the currency of the
lender, in which case reserves are constrained to be nonnegative, and
the opposite case in which borrowing Is always denominated in the
currency of the borrower. The two cases generate quite different
equilibria. Our model does not predict which type of equilibrium will
emerge, or if it will be an intermediate one. This paper suggests,however,
that a theory of default combined with an assumption of convertibility
niay be incorporated into the model to endogenize this decision.'
We show that when loans are denominated in the currency of
countries with low rates of inflation under financial autarky become
borrowers, while countries with high inflation rates become lenders.
Becoming a borrower In Its own currency raises a country's steady—state
inflationrate but has noeffect on the steady—state inflation
rateofthe lender. Moving from financial autarky to trade In reserves
thusraises the average world inflation rate. The effect during the
the borrower6
transition from one steady state to the other may be quitedifferent,
however, with the reserve issuer experiencing a lower inflation ratealong
the way. The opposite results with respect to inflation arise whenloans
are denominated in the lender's currency. In this case, the high—inflation
countries lend to low—inflation ones in the former group'scurrencies.
Theseloans then provide an incentive for lenders to lower their inflation
rates but have no effect on inflation in the secondgroup. The average
world inflation rate is consequently lower in the long run.
Our model allows one to compute the welfare effects of trade in
reserves. We find that inthesteady state,theutility of the representa-
tive generationis higher in lender countries but can be lower in borrower
countries. The effects on generations alive during the transitionmay be
quite different, however. The results thus suggest a justification for
attempts by some governments to preventtheir currencies from becoming
reservecurrencies.
Section IV discusses some possible extensions of our analysis that
we believe would be especially worthwhile. Each of the issues raised
here can potentially be analyzed in the framework we have developed, butthey
lie beyond the scope of a single paper. Section V provides a suitmmary of
the major results.7
I. The Closed Economy Model
We illustrate our points in a very simple model. Our point of
departure is the Samuelson (1958) exact consumption—loan model. Individuals
live two periods, earning income only in the first period and saving a
fraction of that income in order to consume in the second period. Individuals
who enter the labor force in period t earn, before tax, an exogenously given
amount in the first period of their lives, a fraction of which is
taxed by the government. Domestic government debt, which is assumed to be
nonetary, is the only asset available to individuals as a store of value.
Output is nonstorable.
We assume that the utility function of a representative individual
entering the labor force in period t is given by
—LnC + 8Ln 0 <8 (1)
where C denotes consumption in the first period of life, t, when the
individual is young, and consumption when the individual is old,
period t + 1. While the Bernoulli assumption is special it provides a
number of restrictions that simplify the analysis substantially. We will
discuss the implication of relaxing some of these assumptions later on.
Let denote the price level in period t and let denote the
real savings, and hence real money holdings at the end of period t of
an individual born in period t. In period t, then, the individual chooses
C and m to maximizeUsubject to the budget constraints8
y(l—t —C
—> 0 (2)
0 d C <it m
t+1t+l t
Here we define the inverse of one plus the inflation rate from period t




whichequals one plus the rate of return on real money balances.
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The government is required to meet a real expenditure path G.
It collects, in period t, a real amount TyLt in tax revenue where Lt
equals the number of young individuals in period t. The deficit is











anddividing equation (4) by L yields, in per worker terms,
d —1 —ty —
—
wheren denotes the growthin the labor force from period t—l to period t
anddenotes government spending per worker. The government's objective in
each period tis to choose a tax rate to maximizeaweighted sum
of the utilities of all generations subject to equation (4) or(41) Thus, in
each period t, the government's objective function is given by
1
—w1U ()
Inchoosing in period t, the government takes all past as given
and assumes that it or its successor will behave equivalently in the future.
Governmentsare therefore assumed to behave in a time—consistent fashion
and to anticipate this behavior correctly.Solving the government budget
constraint (4') incorporatIng optimal private savings behavior characterized
by equation (3') yields, as an expression for the rate of return on currency
in period t,
_ t) (6)
Substituting equations (6) and (3) into equation (1) yields, as an expression
for the utility of a representative member of the generation born in period t,
U —k+ (3. + )Ln Y (1+ )Lit(1— + BLn (it)
k BLnB —(l+)Ln (1 + )10
where is as defined in (6.). Substituting equations (1') and (6)
into the government's objective function (5) and maximizing withrespect
to r yields, from the first—order condition for a maximum,
8(1 — +tS(l + 8) Vt tt —
(8+ Vt_i
which, from equation (6), Implies
B(y —g) (l+n) t
dt— (8)
(84) me_i
Note from expression (7) that when S =1(generatiorborn at tand




——that is, all government spending is tax financed. When >1,so that
greater weight is attached to the utility of the younger generation, then
< so that some government spending is financed by monetary issue.
Conversely, when <1,80thatgreater weight is attached to the older
generation, >tY——thatis, taxes exceed expenditure——so that debt
is retired. If the government objective function is a Benthamiteone, so
that the weight of each living generation is proportional to the number
of its members, then 6 (1 + in which case, if population growth
is positive, there is an ongoing deficit.11
From expression (8), observe that the inflation rate in period t
is higher: (1) the greater government spending is relative to income,
(ii) the higher real money balances are at the end of the previous








Whenthetwoliving generations receive equal weight (6=1)andincome
lessgovernment spending Is equal across periods, then the rate of
return on money balances equals the population growth rate: the economy
is following the golden rule. If 6> 1 or if income less government spending
is decreasing, then the rate of return on money balances is less than the
population growth rate, and conversely. In the case of the Benthamite
utility function and constant population growth, the rate of return on
money is zero.12
II.An Open Economy !bdel with Reserves
Consider now a situation in which the government of the country
being considered (i) has available to it a foreign money which can be
held as a reserve currency or (ii) finds that some of itsmoney is held
abroad as a reserve currency. Denote foreign holdings of domestic money
denominated in domestic currency in period t as M and domestic holdings
of foreign currency denominated in foreign currency in period t as
Mt
Let Pdenote the price level in terms of foreign currency in period t
andE the domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency.
It is assumed that purchasing power parity obtains, so that
EtPt/Pt (11)
Allowing for these government holdings of assets modifies the
government budget constraint ,equation (4), so that it becomes




It is assumed that no international transfers take place.
Defining real domestic currency holdings abroad per domestic worker as
ft (13) PLtt
andreal foreign currency holdings by the domestic government per foreign
worker (where L denotes the number of foreign workers in period t) as
(14)13






and the ratio of foreign workers to domestic workers in period t as
*
At
the government budget constraint may be written








where denotes the growth in the number of foreign workers
between period t—l and period t.
TheBehavior of a Reserve Holder
Consider first the situation of a countrywhose currency is
notheld abroad, but which contemplates holdinga foreign currency as a
reserve. We assume thatthis country treats the rate of returnon the
*
,1reservecurrency, nj as exogenous toits own behavior for all j.14
One reason is that this country may be one of a large number of small
countries that hold this reserve currency, and its contribution to total
demandis negligible. We assume that this country anticipates perfectly
the actual rate of return on foreign currency.
f
Setting m 0 for all
in each period t a tax rate
maximize its objective function
given by equation (5), with
Defining
+ En (1 +
the optimal tax rate isgiven by
6(1+8)g + 8(1 —S )y
tt
(6+8
Therate of Inflation is consequently
(1+ -)(-
=
Substitutingthese expressions into yields






(17), this country chooses
*d of reserves A to
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•1•ji.-15
Differentiating this expression with respect to m yields, as a first—
order condition for a maximum,











* —l xir (1+
*d *d *d
Note that since m depends upon m_1, in general future values of in
viiibe affected by the current reserve holding decision. The best choice
from the current perspective must incorporate the effect of that choice on
the country's ownfuturepolicy response.
This paper will now focus on twospecialcases
csel. w —w1P1
—t,..., <1
In this case one maywrite
/*d'\
Wmi)
—(wj8ki +wk)tn — + (*d) (23)16




andexpression (23) reduces to
(w + 8wi)______(w+i+)x+i (23') —- *d*d *d m1 x) (m÷i —tx1)
In the steady state A1 A1 =At+i t x41
=
*d *d *d = = mTherefore expression (23) can be obtained
onlyif
—1 x=P
Whenxexceeds the demand for foreign reserves is infinite in
steadystate while if is less than p1,deinandequals negative
infinity. From Section I,che autarkic inflation rate is Cl + n)/ S
Consequently,since=pin this case, the demand for foreign reserves in the
steady state is bounded only when the rate of return on foreignreserves equals
thereturnon domestic money. In other words, the demandfor reserves is
infinite1yelastic at the domestic inflation rate.
Case 2.w 0it—1, t
Inthis case, the current government only takes into account the welfare of
generations currently alive. It assumes that future governments will
act equivalently. The current government and future governments thus pursue
different objectives. Inparticular,the currentgovernmentmustincorporate17
the effect of its current policies on the future government's treatment
of the current younger generation.
To solve for optimal reserve demand, it is assumedthat at each period t,
foreignreserves are held according to the formula
*d *d
+ b nii (24)
where a and b denote parameters to be determined.
Substitutingexpression (24) into the objective function for m+i yields














At+1(a+i + b+im —x÷im
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Solvingequation (25) for one obtains
At+i 8(x —b+i)y
—X(8+6) —A+1a+1) t




Sincean equivalent problem will be solved in period t + 1 one may setb - (27)
t+l + 6+68
Substituting this expression into equation (26), it is found that
X (B + 6+ —
a +a (28)
The steady state requires that
*d * - =AX,andm m
yt+i == y, =
X1
X ,At+l t t
Inspection of equation (26) shows that the steady state is only compatible with
a finite demand for reserves if
(29) 68
or
(l+n) (8 +6 +68)
w =________________— (30)
68
If the rate of return on foreign reserves exceeds this level, demand will
grow to infinity and conversely. Thus, in the long run the demand for
foreign reserves is perfectly elastic at the rate of return (l+n) (8+6+86 )
68
This rate of return will exceed the return on domestic money, which remains
(1-n) •Thereforea country in which the government maximizes the welfare
of only generations currently alive will not hold reserves unless the.
return strictly exceeds the rate of return on domestic currency. The reason
is that an unborn generation, the younger generation in period t+l, will
share the return from an investment in reserves in period t with the younger
generation in period t. The myopic government weights only the second gain in
making its decision. Consequently, a higher rate of return is required for an
investment in reserves to appear worthwhile.19
TheBehavior of a Reserve Issuer
Consider noi the behavior of a country which holds no foreign
currencies, but which finds that foreign countries hold its currency as
a reserve. It is assumed that this country takes foreign holdings of its own
currency, ,asgiven in each period i. That is, when the government
makes its taxation decision, other countries have made their past and
contemporaneous reserve holding decisions. Because it raises a complicated,
but very Interesting, set of issues that lie beyond its scope, this paper
ignoresthe possibility of a reputation effect whereby reserve holders'
expectationsof future inflation are determined bypast performance.
Rather,reserve holdersform expectation of future inflation by calculating
theoptimal behavior of the reserve issuer each period.
*d Setting m1 =0for all i in equation (17), theexpression for
inflation,given t,becomes
+ r)y —(1+ + (l+8)m -
f (31)
8(1 —Tt_i)Yt_i+(1+ 8) me_i
Since equations (3)and(Y') continue to define consumption in eachperiod,
theutilityof anindividualentering the labor force in period t is
=k+ (1 +B)ln (1 - - 81n
{8(1_Tt
+(l + B)tn]
+ 81n + -(1+ 8)g1 +(1+8 )m+i (32)
1n8— (1+8) £n(l+8) +L (l+n).
Continuing to assume a government objective function of the form of
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2t(l —:'t+ (1 + 8)m
Notethat the solution to equation (33)involvesonly contemporaneous
variables.The effect of an increase in contemporaneous money holdings,
is given by
d2Wt






which is negative: the domestic tax rate falls as foreign holdings of
the domestic currency rise.
Considernowthe effect of an increase in foreign holdings of
domesticcurrency on the rate of return on currency. Given current
holdings, m, an increase in the previous period's holdings,
lowers 11.This result is evident from Inspection of expressIon (31).
f f Theeffect of an increase in m, given ni1, is21
dt (1 + 'ttd+ (1 + ) t 1
= (35)
d1n 2t—l
which,incorporating expression (34), has the same sign as
(8+ 2)( -1)(1 -t)2y2(1 + )2(1_ tt)ytm + (1 + 8) m (36)
Thisexpression isnegative if issmall andis less than one. For
large values of m, it is positive. Therefore,an increase in foreign
reserve holdings has an ambiguous effect on the inflation rate that period.
Consideran increase in foreign reserveholdings in period t from a
levelof zero to some positive permanent level, ;f• The effect on on
impact is given by the sign of expression (36). The effect on ir, i >
assumingconstant values of y and is given by
=
(1+ B) + 2+(1 + B)tn]
which is necessarily negative. This result establishes the following proposition
Proposition 1: A permanent increase in foreign holdings of domestic
currencylowers the rate of return on the currency (i.e., raises the
inflation rate) in the steady state.
All new foreign holders of the domestic currency will earn the
new steadystate rate of return on that currency, since increased holdings
inperiod t raise to the new steady state level. During period t
inwhich newreservesare acquired, however, the rate of return will never fall by as
much as the steady—state change and may even rise. A permanent increase in re-
serves held abroad will consequently increase the permanent inflation rate, though
itmay iflitjallY lower the inflation rate.22
III. Multi—country Equilibrium
Consider a world in which there are two types of countries,
type I and type II. Each type of country can be characterized by a steady
state inf].ation rate that would obtain under reserve autarky (4',j= i,ii)
and a rate irat which the long—run demand for foreign reserves is infinitely
elastics It is assumed that 4<4;thatis, type i countries
have higher inflation under autarky, and that ir <
that is, type I countries demand reserves at a rate of return below the
autarky rate of return on type II currency.3
-
Thissection considers how the introduction of inter-
nationally held currencies will change the steady state of the-world
economy. it focuses first on two extreme cases, one in which reserves
cannot be held in negative amounts and one in which reserves cannot
be held in positive amounts. The first case corresponds to one in which
loans are denominated in the borrower's currency and the second to one
in which they are denominated in the lender's currency. While the model
does not preclude a priori the possibility of two—way transfers of reserves,
attention will -focus only on steady states in which net and gross
reserve positions are identical.
Nonnegative Reserves
The following proposition can now be established;
Proposition 2: In a steady state in which foreign reserves are held at a
positive, finite level, (i) type II (low—inflation) currency will be held by
type I (high—inflation) countries as a reserve, arid (ii) the rate of return on
type II currency will fall to ir1.23
Ifthe weights attached to future generations by each government
decline geometrically——so that =ir,j=I,Il——then the inflation rate
in type I countries does not change, while the inflation ratein type II
countries will rise tor4.Thus,while under autarky = =
(fromequation (lO) when reserve holdings are allowed, = =
introducingreserves has raised inflation everywhere tothe level in the
high—inflationcountries. The superscriptR denotes steady—state rates
of return when international lending takes place. The reasonis that type I
countries find type II currencies attractive at their autarkyinflation
rates. An excess demand for these currencies willexist until the inflation
rate is driven up to the level in type II countries.As type I countries
accumulate reserves, the increased reserves provide anincentive for
type II countries to inflate at a higher rate,imposing an inflation
tax on type I countries. Since the welfareof foreign holders of its
currency, as opposed to domestic holders,does not enter the reserve
issuers' objective functions, they are less constrained tomaintain
low inflation rates.
The case in which lTj> forjI or j =IIis slightly more
complicated. If, say, <it1 < then,again, type II countries
will issue reserves to type I countries. In the new steady state,
Again, becoming reserve currency issuers hasraised inflation rates in
.type IIcountries,but not as high as the autarky inflationratein type I
countries. Type IIcountrieswill again experience strictly higher
inflation rates in the newsteadystate.
These results suggest how introducing liabilitiesdenominated in the
borrower's currency can create more inflation in the world economy.The welfare24
Implicationsof introducing international reserves can be analyzed in terms
of our model. This paper will not attempt a thorough discussion but will
make the following points:
(1) In a steady state with finite reserves, type I (high—inflation,
reserve—holding) countries have as an additional source of government
—l revenue an amount Äñ [ir1(l+n) —1]per worker where m denotes
t+i steady—state reserve holdings. Whenw1 wI>0,this amount
equalsAm*(hl) and whenw =0(it—l, t),it equals Am* (&+)
Taxes are lower and the rate of return on currency has not changed:
The representative Individual in type I countries is better off in
the stead1 state. (Here 5I denotes type I countries' value of s..)
(2)In a steady state with finite reserves, type II (low—inflation,
f * —l reserve—issuing) countries transfer an amount m [1 —, (1-I-n)]totype
I countries each period. Therepresentativeindividual in type II
countries can be worse off in the steady state because the rate of
return on his savings has declined.
(3) The older generation n the perIod in whIch reserves are
in the reserve holding countries suffers from the transition.
The rate of return on their money holdings is lower than under autarky.
*d (This result may be seen by settingm1 =0in equation (18) and
observing the effect of increasingm on 71inequation (20).)
(4)Theyounger generation in the period in which reserves are
issuedbythe reserve currencycountry benefitsfrom lower taxes in that
period but experiences a lower return on savings in the subsequent period.
The net effect on welfareIstherefore ambiguous.
(5) The effect of the transition on the older generation in the
reserve—issuing country is ambiguous, depending whetherrises or falls
as a consequence of issuing reserves.25
Thus,the long—run effect of a move from reserve autarky to
trade in currencies raises steady—state welfare in the reserve—holding
countries but can lower steady—state welfare in the issuing countries.
Theeffects during the transition, however, maygo in the opposite
direction.
Oneremainingquestion is how much currencyof a typical type II
country will be held abroad atthe point where the rate of return onthat
country's currency equalstr1. Ifall type llcountries are identical in
all respects except relative populationsize each type II country will have
the same worker money stock held abroad as a reserve currencyin the
reserve equilibrium. The contributionof each type II country 'to total
international reserves will therefore be proportionalto that country's
population.
NonpositiveReserves
The following proposition can also be established:
Proposition 3: In any steady state in which international borrow-
ingtakes the form of issuing foreign—currency—denominated liabilities
at a finite, positive level, (i)type II (low—inflation) countries will
borrowfrom type I (high—inflatior1) countries, and (ii) the rate of
return type I currencywill rise to it11.
A
Consider first the case in which =i = III. If type
II countries can issue liabilities denominated in type I currency, they
will do so tntil rises to 4.Thus,when positive, rather than
negative, reserve holdings are precluded, international financial
integration reduces, rather than increases, inflation. The reason is
that when countries lend in their own currency, rather than borrow by
issuing reserves denominated in their owncurrency,their26
governmentshave an incentive to reduce, rather than to increase, their
inflation rates.
The welfare effects of international financial integration when
borrowing is foreign—currency denominated, both on impact and in the steady
state, can be analyzed as well. The effects are substantially similar, so
that issue will not be discussed here.
Relaxing the Nonegativity Constraints
If no constraint is imposed on the sign of reserve issue our model
admitsan infinite number of solutions. While borrowing in bothdomestic
andforeign currency denominated assets occurs in international financial
markets, the possibility of outright default may placean upper bound on
theextent to which foreign currency denominated borrowing occurs. De-
faultonsuch liabilities can occur without affecting the value of domestic
agents'savings.As long as currency is internationally mobile, default on
domestic currency held abroad could only occur if domestic households were
defaulted upon as well. This ramification is likely to limit the incentive
of a national government to default o its domestic currency or to destroy
its value through inflation.
Introducinga Nominal Interest Rate on Borrowing
It has been assumed that money pays a zero nominal rate of return.
Introducing a nonzero nominalinterest rate would not affect the results,
exceptthat the inflation rate would equal the nominal rate minus the
real rate of return derived here, Whatever nominal returna reserve
issuer offers its creditors ex ante, it determines the realrate of
return expost through itsinflation policy.27
IV. Possible Extensions
This paper has developed a model for analyzing the effects of
introducing reserve currencies on inflation and welfare in the world
economy. In order to obtain concrete results the analysis has been kept very
simple. We conclude with a discussion of some issues that we believe are
of considerable interest that could be analyzed in terms of the framework
we develophere.
Non—Bernoulli Preferences
The assumption of the model that utility is logarithmic in consumption
levelsleads to savings behavior and private currency demand that is independent of
the rate of return on thecurrency. The analysis is enormously simplified
by this assumption. Alternative specifications would lead to much more
complicated responses to alternative policies. In particular, the effect
of expectations of future policy on the current private demand for currency
would have to be incorporated into the model. Introducing non—Bernoulli
preferences would consequently introduce a much richer set of dynamics
as well as an additional source of potential time inconsistency of optimal
policy.
Distortioriary Taxation
Our model assumes that the government has access to proportional
income taxes as a means of raising government revenue. Since income is
exogenous in our model, such taxes are nondistortionary. If taxes do, in
fact, impose an excess burden, then an additional role for seigniorage
arises, as an alternative distortionary source of revenue. Differences
in autarky inflation rates may then reflect differenct financing needs
among countries as well as different valuations of generations by govern—
ments. The role of• seigniorage as a form of optimal taxation in an open2g
economy has been analyzed in a small, open economy context by Calvo (1978)
and Eaton (1982), but the role of reserves in redistributingtax burdens
internationally has yet to be studied.
Default Risk
Our model does not introduce formally the possibility ofoutright
default on foreign debt. The issue of default has by now beeninvestigated
extensively. See, for example Eaton and Gersovitz (l981a, 1981b), Sachs
and Cohen (1982), or Kletzer (1982). One topic of potential interest
would be to integrate analytic models of default into our paper's
framework here. As suggested earlier, one important issue that such
research might shed light upon is the currency of denomination of
international debt.
Productive Capital
No role for productive capital exists in the model. The effects
of international capital market integration on the allocation ofcapital
has been analyzed in a nonmonetary overlapping generations modelby
Buiter (1981). It would be of considerable interest toinvestigate how
the monetary phenomena considered here would interact with theinter-
national allocation of capital in the steady state, Inparticular, it
would he interesting to determine to what extent thetrading of
monetary assets can substitute for trade in physical capital.
Uncertainty
Our model assumes perfect certainty. Introducinguncertainty
about future values of exogenous variables wouldprovide insight Into a29
number of issues. For example, the effects on uncertainty on the rates
of return of alternative currencies could be examined. Optimal reserve
portfolios could then be characterized,which could presumably include
more than one reserve held simultaneously. The role of government policy
in redistributing risk between generations domestically and the role of
reserves in reallocating risk internationally could be examined. Lapan
and Enders (1980), Aizenman (1981), and Eaton (1982) have considered the
implications of alternative exchange rate regimes for the International
allocation of risk. The implications of their analysis for reserve
positions in a multicountry context have yet to be drawn out.
Strategic Behavior
Inour model governments make decisions taking other countries'
inflation rates and reserve positions as given. While this assumption
can be justified in a competitive contextinwhich the numbers ofcountries
ofdifferent types arelarge,it Isless appropriate in a world where some
countriesare unique in their relevant characteristics. One possibility
is that strategic competition among potential reserve issuers wiU arise. The
countrywhich is nest successful at establishing a reputation as providing
a high and stablereturn on currency might then emerge asthe sole reserve
issuer.30
V. Conclusion
The major conclusions of our analysis can be summarized in the
followingpoints:
(1) Under financial autarky, inflation rates in different countries
can be explained by their monetary authorities' attitudes toward the
welfare of the younger and older generations. The probl2m of time consistency
mayyieldan inflation rate that is not optimal.
(2) A government's demand for a foreign currency as a reserve
in the long run may be infinitely elastic at a rate of return that is
equal to or higher than the rate of return on that country's currency.
Holding a foreign currency as a reserve does not affect the steady—state
inflation rate of the reserve holder.
(3) The steady—state inflation rate of a country increases when
foreign demand for that country's currency as a reserve rises to a higher
permanent level.
(4) Trade in borrower—currency—denominated assets raises the
average steady—state world inflation rate, while trade in lender—currency—
denominated assets has the opposite effect.
(5) Trade in assets raises steady—state lifetime welfare in
reserve—holding countries but can lowerit in reserve—issuing countries,
althoughthe effect on the welfare of generations alive during the
transition from autaky to the new steady state may be reversed. Govern-
ments may therefore be justified In acting to prevent their currencies'
use as International reserves,3].
FOOTNOTES
1"Recently, Townsend (1980) has shown that the exact consumption
loan specification can be generated by a much larger class of transactions
technologies than that suggested by the Saniuelson model and subsequent
literature.
generally, as Kareken and Wallace (1981) have pointed out,
the multicountry model of the type we are dealing with is characterized
by multiple equilibria. The paper restricts its attention to equilibria
in which gross and net reserve positions are equal, and in which there is
either a nonnegativity constraint or nonpositivity constrain on reserve
positions. These restrictions identify a unique steady—state equilibrium.
1Reca11 from the first subsection of Section I that when
weights on the utilities of each generation in the government's objective
functionin period t are of the form w1 = forall t and i
then while ifw =0,t #t,t—l,then >
1T.32
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